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1. INTRODUCTION
Environmental issues pose a vexing threat to the global
community, apparently defying any single solution. To use a
military analogy, it is a war that must be fought on many fronts.
This concept is perhaps best evidenced by the development of
environmental policy in the United States,1 where both public
and private actors have been instrumental in addressing environ-
mental problems. For example, under careful public scrutiny,
private lenders now frequently guarantee their client's compliance
with public environmental policy.
2
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' The beginnings of public concern with environmental policy can be
clearly seen in the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in the early
1970's. For a comprehensive overview df the origins and initial impact of
NEPA, see Risa Vetri Ferman, Comment, Environmental Disclosures and SEC
Reporting Requirements, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 485-500 (1992). For a
comprehensive discussion of the origins of the EPA, see MARC K. LANDY ET
AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG
QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 2245 (1994).
2 The rapid development of this particular relationship has been aptly
described as the environmental liability roller coaster." Stephen L. Kass &
Michael B. Gerrard, New Worriesfor Banks, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1993, at 3. This
ride began with a breath-taking plunge into federal court. See United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-60 (11th Cir. 1990) (establishing lender
liability for borrower's environmental actions). It then leveled out briefly due
to administrative action. See Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344, 18,374-80 (1992) (providing a "safe harbor" for lenders from liability f6r
borrower's environmental actions); George C. Weir, Lender and Fiduciary
Liability Under the EPA's Final Rule, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1993, at 14
(discussing the implications of the EPA's "safe harbor"; Brian S.B. Lee,
Comment, A Ride on the Environmental Roller Coaster, 12 PACE ENvTL. L.
REV. 445, 468-70 (1994) (discussing the implications of the Poling letter); Letter
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This multi-front mentality is also being adopted international-
ly. In addition to developing increasingly sophisticated public
enforcement mechanisms, the international community has begun
to rely on private parties, such as the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, to implement environmental policy. These
practices might also be used to reinforce public environmental
policies through the imposition of private environmental require-
ments on borrowers.3
While the components of public international environmental
policy are becoming increasingly clear, what remains unclear is the
means by which private parties, such as lenders, may strictly
enforce the environmental compliance provisions they routinely
place on their clients. This becomes a key issue for all institutions
involved in lending funds to support industrial development. In
the United States, lenders increasingly rely on private third-party
institutions to enforce environmental compliance among their
borrowers.4  Environmental insurance plays an increasingly
important role as both a mechanism to assume the environmental
risk associated with industrial projects and as an indirect compli-
ance tool to assure that environmental requirements are being
met.5 In the complex world of multinational lending, however,
insurance does not yet play a role as a lender's tool for assuring
compliance.
This Essay will explore the benefits of using environmental
from Stanley J. Poling, Director, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), to Chief Executive Officers of FDIC-Supervised Banks (Feb. 25,
1993) (providing guidance to lenders in avoiding liability for borrower's
environmental actions). The ride then plunged again into federal court. See,
e.g., Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (vacating the EPA's
"safe harbor"). Somewhat winded by the ride, private lenders have opted to get
off the roller coaster, voluntarily adopting more stringent, private measures
than any previously suggested by the federal government to this point. See
Property Specific Transactions, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Mar. 8,
1993, at 7, 9.
' See, e.g., Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the
World Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 822-35 (1995;
John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 382-84 (1995).
4 See Gary Hector, A New Reason You Can't Get a Loan, FORTUNE, Sept.
21, 1992, at 107, 108.
s See Michael Quint, Insuring Environmental Liabilities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.




insurance as a tool in commercial lending practice in the United
States, and will extrapolate by analogy the benefits which may be
available to international lenders as they assess the available means
to ensure compliance with environmental policies. This Essay
will first discuss the environmental liability concerns faced by
lenders. Then, it will describe the environmental insurance
strategies used to limit these concerns in the United States.
Finally, this Essay will conclude with an analysis of the potential
application of these practices to international lending.
2. NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
As specifically relates to domestic projects secured by real
property assets, lenders have two areas of concern regarding
environmental policy. Both concerns have had a chilling effect on
lending institutions and their willingness to pursue secured loans.6
The first, and most critical, concern is the impact environmen-
tal policy may have on the operations, and thus the financial
condition, of a lender's customers. In particular, lenders ask
themselves if the ongoing business operations of borrowers will
result in environmental liability that affects the borrower's ability
to repay its loans.7 Satisfaction of this concern demands that the
ongoing business operations of a borrower remain in compliance
with environmental policy. Generally, the lender requires
assurance that the operations of the borrower will be conducted
in a manner consistent with operating permits provided to the
borrower by government agencies, and that the levels of pollut-
ants created and dispersed by the borrower are within regulatory
guidelines. This concern has intensified as governmental policy
has substantially increased the potential liability of commercial
firms for the environmental consequences of their corporate
activities!
Second, lenders are concerned about incurring direct environ-
6 See Barnaby J. Feder, New Policy on Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1991,
at F7; Ron Suskind, Fleet Financial to Broaden Requirement of Environmental
Liability Insurance, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1992, at A2; Rodd Zolkos, Lending
Banks a Hand on Superfund, Bus. INS., Oct. 2, 1995, at 17.
7 See Feder, supra note 6, at F7; Suskind, supra note 6, at A12; Zolkos,
supra note 6, at 17.
s Risk management expert H. Felix Kloman identifies environmental
liability as the "risk of the decade" for corporate risk managers. H. Felix
Kloman, Issues for 1995, RISK MGMT. REP., Jan. 1995, at 1, 4.
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mental liability when exercising operational control over an
impaired collateral asset, should they have to foreclose.9 In the
United States, this concern is a direct result of federal Superfund
legislation,10 as well as its state and local counterparts. This
legislation addresses responsibility for prior environmental
contamination. Superfund, and its associated judicial interpreta-
tions, make an owner of real property responsible for all costs
incurred in remediating environmental contamination arising from
prior activities." A current owner is responsible for the environ-
mental legacy of a property, even if the owner is new and has had
no prior relationship to the property. 2  Often, the costs of
resolving old contamination on property can be substantial13 and
can even exceed the value of the property itself.
3. STRATEGIES USED TO ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE
Lenders employ three strategies to minimize these liability
concerns when lending to borrowers with projects secured by real
property: 1) preliminary evaluation of environmental impact,
including review of past, present, and future environmental
conditions; 2) initial assessment of compliance of the project with
appropriate government standards of environmental behavior; and
3) ongoing monitoring of borrower behavior to assure continued
compliance with acceptable standards of conduct.
1 4
With regard to the first strategy, the lender must determine
the known environmental issues associated with a project, and
study the expected environmental impacts of the project. For
example, lenders for large new projects often require environmen-
tal impact assessments to be performed and approved before
9 See Feder, supra note 6, at F7; Hector, supra note 4, at 108; Suskind, supra
note 6; Zolkos, supra note 6, at 17.
10 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. S 9601-9675 a1994) so known as Superfund").
n1 See LLOYD S. DIXON, FIXING SUPERFUND: THE EFFECT OF THE
PROPOSED SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1994 ON TRANSACTION COSTS 3
(1994).
12 See id.
13 See LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES
AND TRANSACTION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES 20-25 (1993).
1 See Jill A. Kotvis, Lender Liability Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS




projects begin. 5 These assessments are designed to identify the
impacts of projects upon specific protected groups, including
endangered species, wetlands, and culturally significant lands. The
assessment may also uncover prior contamination or environmen-
tal impairment affecting a project property's initial condition. 6
In implementing the second strategy, the lender requires that
the borrower obtain all appropriate permits or performs appropri-
ate procedures necessary to assure initial compliance with the
applicable environmental standards for the project. The environ-
mental standards required of the borrower usually mirror well
understood governmental policies and procedures. Useful
benchmarks may include: permits for release of hazardous
materials,1 7 instructions regarding the installation of specified
pollution control devices, and reporting protocols that identify
materials stored at a facility.9 In the absence of such well-
defined regulations and procedures, the standards may be laid out
by the lender itself, on the basis of specifications established by
environmental groups, donor nations, and other international
agencies.20
The third strategy involves the lending institution focusing on
contractual obligations within the loan documents. Lenders will
incorporate environmental issues as part of the contractual
obligations.21 Generally, these concerns are addressed in the
representations and warranties made by the borrower to the
lender, the violation of which constitutes a default under the loan
agreement.' For example, the lender will usually have the
15 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL,
OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE No. 4.01, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 17(1991).
16 See, e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS (ASTM),
STANDARD PRACTICE No. E1528-93, ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT
TRANSACTION SCREEN PROCESS (1996).
17 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901-6992k (1994).
1 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conpensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. % 9601-9675 (1994) lso known as"Superfund').
19 See Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA),
42 U.S.C. % 11001-11050 (1994).
20 See Bowles & Kormos, supra note 3, at 782-83.
21 See Kotvis, supra note 14, at 97-108.
' See id. at 105-06. For excellent examples of such representations and
warranties in an environmental context, see Gail V. Karlsson, The Impact of
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borrower represent that the project will be operated in compliance
with current environmental standards and warrant that all actions
required to remain in compliance with environmental standards
will be undertaken by the borrower. The borrower may also
be required to indemnify the lender for any consequences related
to the borrower's failure to comply with the environmental
representations and warranties.24
4. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE IN CURRENT
LENDING
Increasingly, lenders rely upon third party mechanisms to
assist them in implementing these strategies. Some of these
mechanisms, such as environmental impact statements and
environmental audits, have been used with varying degrees of
success.' Environmental insurance has been increasingly used in
this capacity as well.26  Of the available options, however,
insurance has two distinct advantages for lenders. First, insurance
performs the dual role of both identifying and assuming risk.
While an environmental impact statement or audit can identify a
potential risk, insurance can assume that risk based on specific
contractual provisions. Second, insurance provides continual
evaluation of an insured's activity by the insurance company. By
insisting that a risk be insured, a lender requires its borrower to
be subject to the review and monitoring requirements of the
insurance carrier. Since the insurance company assumes risk with
respect to the insured's activities, the willingness of the insurance
company to issue coverage with respect to a defined exposure is
based on its ability to underwrite the risk, which includes
appropriate inspection of the operations of the insured.
In the environmental area, three types of insurance coverage
have proven to be of particular benefit to lenders. First, insurance
coverage exists which can fix the cost of remediating known
Environmental Liabilities on Real Estate Contract Negotiations, 8 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 37, 44-47 (1990).
23 See Karlsson, supra note 22, at 44-47.
24 See id.
21 See Zolkos, supra note 6, at 17.
26 See Quint, supra note 5, at D5. For a detailed discussion of the transfer
of environmental risk through insurance, see PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD





contamination.' With increasing frequency, a borrower will
purchase a property with existing contamination, budget reined-
iation expenses for the desired project, and still be able to turn a
profit.2' The success of such ventures, of course, relies on the
accuracy with which remediation expenses can be predicted.
Often, this is very uncertain. However, by purchasing this type
of insurance, the borrower can effectively cap its remediation
expenditures at the predicted level, thereby addressing the lender's
concern that remediation cost overruns may affect the borrower's
ability to repay its loans.
The second type of insurance also addresses a lender's concern
over whether a borrower may repay its loans, by assuming any
liability for accidental environmental contamination from present
and future business operations.29 This coverage pays for damages
associated with hazardous materials emanating from a defined
location and causing injury to property or people. By insisting
that a borrower maintain coverage for this risk, lenders take
advantage of the willingness of the insurance company to assume
the risk based on the monitoring and inspection the insurance
company must perform in order to define and limit the risk. The
inspection process encourages the borrower to engage in loss-
prevention measures, so as to minimize premium charges.
The third type of insurance can assume the liabilities associated
with unknown contamination.30 Should insured real property
used as security for a project still have hidden contamination on-
site, despite the best efforts of the borrower and insurer to locate
it, this insurance compensates for the future consequences of this
contamination should it ever be detected. This coverage addresses
both the lender's concern that an unexpected risk from prior
contamination may affect the borrower's ability to repay its loan
and the lender's concern that it will incur unanticipated liability
2 This type of environmental insurance is often referred to as Stop-Loss or
Cost-Cap coverage. For a more detailed description, see The Wharton Forum
on Environmental Strategy, Insuring Environmental Risks 17 (1997) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law).
28 See Barbara Mooney, Firm Finds Value in Land That Has Been Contami-
nated, CRAiN's CLEV. BUS., Oct. 17, 1994, at 15, 15.
29 This type of environmental insurance is often referred to as Post-
Remediation coverage. See The Wharton Forum on Environmental Strategy,
supra note 27, at 18.
30 One such product is called Property Transfer Liability Insurance. See id.
at 15.
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should it have to foreclose on the property.
Increasingly, these insurance products have become an integral
component of domestic lending in resolving environmental issues
which affect their lending policy. Often insurance permits
transactions to proceed which may otherwise be stalled by
environmental concerns.
5. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE IN
MULTINATIONAL LENDING
While environmental insurance is playing an increasing role in
domestic lending policy and practice, environmental insurance has
almost no role in multinational lending. Multinational lending
institutions have consistently expressed the same concerns
regarding environmental issues and their lending practices as
expressed by U.S. domestic lenders, but have not been as active in
using third parties to address these concerns. Perhaps this
partially explains the difficulties many multinational lenders face
in enforcing environmental provisions on an international scale.31
For this reason, the direct and indirect benefits of environmental
insurance may be of even greater importance to multinational
lenders.
In domestic lending, a bank may require its customers to
comply with environmental policies dictated by governmental
agencies.32 It may then insist that insurance be procured to pay
for violations of government standards.33 This strategy relies to
a certain extent upon existing environmental standards to
determine acceptable environmental behavior.
Similarly, given international environmental standards, it is
possible to use an insurance contract as a means to enforce
international environmental behavior. For example, an interna-
tional lending document could require that the borrower provide
insurance to pay for damages resulting from releases of hazardous
materials. The insurance company, as a contractual condition of
issuing and renewing the policy, could require that the insured
"' World Bank borrowers comply with only twenty-two percent of World
Bank financial covenants. See Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations
and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 553, 564 (1994).
32 See supra Section 3.




adhere to safety, pollution control, equipment maintenance,
worker protection, and other behaviors and procedures. The
insurer would then inspect and examine its insured's operations.
As with domestic lending practices, this process could conceivably
create and enforce a private regulatory framework which reflects
public environmental values.
The complicating issue is, of course, that no true uniform
international environmental standards currently exist. This creates
an intranational problem for the lender attempting to lend to
borrowers outside its country of origin. To the extent that the
country in which the borrower is located has a national environ-
mental policy that is well articulated and enforced, there is less of
a problem. But particularly in developing countries, where
competing public policies of creating a modern infrastructure and
protecting the environment may conflict, such viable public
environmental policies may not exist, making it difficult for
lenders and insurers to play a role in enforcing public environ-
mental policy.
Even among nations which have viable environmental policies,
there is an international problem facing the institution trying to
lend to borrowers outside its country of origin. In requiring
adherence to the environmental laws of another nation, the lender
raises questions of international law as to whether those commit-
ments may be viewed and enforced as "treaty" obligations.1
4 Of
course, that is not the proper role of lending institutions. As in
the United States,35 the answer may continue to be for lenders
to rise above these intra- and international difficulties by creating
a private standard which addresses public environmental concerns.
Multinational lenders may be able to partially enforce such
standards, thereby accomplishing environmental compliance goals,
by requiring environmental insurance on their loans. Insisting on
specific coverages, the lender defines for the insurer the risks with
which it is concerned. For example, a lender may insist that a
borrower provide insurance to pay for damages resulting from the
release of chemicals from a manufacturing facility. This request
effectively defines the risk for the insurer in such a way that the
insurer can then calculate which terms, conditions, requirements,
and premiums would be necessary to provide the risk transfer
" See Linarelli, supra note 3, at 426-27.
31 See supra note 2.
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requested. The insurers would establish the standards of behavior
to be met by potential insureds as a precondition for the provision
of this insurance. Since underwriting requirements must be met
before insurance coverage will be placed, these underwriting
standards become an informal, but potent, tool to regulate the
behavior of insureds with respect to projects funded by multi-
national lending institutions.
The use of insurance in international lending will require
significant effort to adapt policies created for domestic markets to
meet international lending needs; however, this process should be
feasible. Many of the insurance companies actively involved in
the environmental market in the United States are active interna-
tional companies. Some are large multinational insurance and
reinsurance firms. These companies understand the risks, know
the risk management strategies required to control the risks, and
have extensive monitoring and compliance experience. To the
extent that major U.S. or European firms may be involved in
supporting projects for which the multinational firms are lending,
their domestic operations would have had considerable experience
with the environmental insurance marketplace requirements.
While insurance can be expensive, its value-added monitoring
services may more than offset the costs.
6. CONCLUSION
Domestically, lenders and insurers have played a complimenta-
ry role to public actors in enforcing public environmental policy.
The potential for these private actors to play a similar role on an
international scale is quite promising. This is not to say that it
will be easy. Such a scheme will continue to require lenders to
adopt universal environmental standards as pre-conditions to
lending, and will require insurers to adapt so as to be able to
enforce these standards. Nevertheless, the situation certainly
cannot be seen as being more complex than that faced in the
United States just a few years ago, though the scope is larger.
Private parties overcame the obstacles then, and can use the
experience gained to do the same on a much larger scale today.
It is critical that the international community use all of the
weapons at its disposal to prevent the fervor for economic
development from becoming an environmental threat.
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